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JEFFREY SACHS
In an open economy with a floaLing exchange rate, the efficacy of fiscal and
monetary policy depends fundamentally on the wage-setting pnxiess. In the canonical
models of Mundell and Fleming, monetary expansion raises output via an exchange
rate depreciation, while fiscal expansion has no output effect. These results hold only
when real wages can be altered by exchange rate movements; if the real wage is fixed,
the Mundell-Fleming ranking of policy is reversed. This paper explores the interaction
of wages and policy in short- and long-run models, under the assumptions of perfect
foresight and world capital mobility.
After seven years of floating exchange rates, the implications of
Hexible rates for countercyclical macroeconomic policy remain in
douht. The traditional view, following the pioneering work of Mundell
1196;?) and Fleming [1962] (henceforth M-F), is that expansionary
monetary policy, hy inducing depreciation ofthe real exchange rate,
is effective in raising output in a small, underemployed economy.
Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is seen as less effective. In the stan-
dard analysis, a rise in government spending leads to appreciation and
crowding-out of net exports.
An alternative view of flexihle rates, set forth in the full-em-
ployment models of glohal monetarism, maintains that a money
supply expansion can change only the exchange rate and price level,
but not output and employment. While an increase in money causes
depreciation ofthe nominal exchange rate, the domestic price level
rises to offset the competitive gain envisaged in the M-F model. The
alternative view has had less to say on the effects of fiscal policy and
on the general question of prolonged unemployment.
Both views of monetary policy have adherents, and there is evi-
dence, in different countries and at different times, to support each.
Their appropriateness, I shall argue here, depends crucially on the
nature of the wage-determination process. The M-F model (in an
extended form) requires that nominal exchange-rate changes alter
the real wage.^  Implicit is an underlying view, going hack to Keynes,
* 1 would like to thank Michael Bruno, Rudiger Dornbusch, Dale Henderson, and
Janet Yellen for very helpful discussions, and Susanna French for editorial aasis-
lance.
1. The original models ignore wages altogether, letting prices be rigid. Since the
econometric evidence overwhelmingly suggests that prices are markups over wages,
we adopt the interpretation that wages are rigid and that prices adjust to wages. Prices
;ire later described according to a variable markup, in line with marginal-cost pricing.
None of the qualitative conclusions of the paper are changed if we adopt a fixed-markup
pricing rule.
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that in the short run, nominal wage changes proceed somewhat in-
dependently of price level changes. A contrasting hypothesis is that
real-wage developments are little influenced hy nominal values. In
this case the M-F conclusions regarding monetary and fiscal policy
are reversed.
The suggestion that real-wage rigidity vitiates monetary policy
is familiar from closed-economy models. However, the mechanism
through which wage determination and output are connected is quite
different in the closed- and open-economy cases. In the open economy
the consumer price level is a function of domestic and foreign prices.
The general price level can change even when domestic prices are
fixed. Monetary policy has direct links to prices through exchange-rate
changes. Also, there is no one-to-one relationship between real wages
(nominal wages deflated hy the CPI) and aggregate supply, as there
is in a closed-economy model. The output supply of domestic firms
is determined by the ratio of wages to domestic prices. Since the ratio
of domestic to foreign prices can be altered, different levels of aggre-
gate supply are consistent with the same real wage. Finally, a real wage
decline increases output through different channels in closed- and
open-economy models. In the closed economy a drop in real wages
tends to reduce the real interest rate, thus boosting aggregate demand.
In the open economy, which faces a given world real interest rate, the
path is from real wages to international price competitiveness.
The analysis is divided into three parts. In Section I some data
are presented to support the relevance of models with short-run
real-wage rigidity, ln Section II the short-run M-F model is extended
to compare the implications of nominal-wage and real-wage rigidity.
The simple comparative statics results repeat the conclusions in Casas
[1975], Argy and Salop [1977], and Sachs [1978]. New results are ob-
tained by allowing for short lags in wage indexation and changes in
real-wage levels over time. The time horizon of the short-run model
is extended in Section III, where we allow for wealth effects due to
current account imbalances.
I. WAGE DETERMINATION IN OECD ECONOMIES
Two contrasting views of wage determination have dominated
macroeconomic discussions in recent years, labeled by Perry [1975]
as wage-Inertia (or wage-wage) versus wage-price models. In the first,
wages follow an auto-regressive scheme; nominal-wage change in the
current period is determined by the past pattern of nominal-wage
change and by the level of unemployment. In the wage-price model
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nominal wages adjust to current or expected price changes in order
to keep real wages moving close to targets, which may in turn be in-
fluenced hy the unemployment rate. In the wage-wage model real
wages can he altered by anticipated monetary policy, while in the
wage-price model they cannot.
The wage-wage hypothesis goes back to Keynes's observation
that workers' concern for relative wages may lead to sluggish nomi-
nal-wage change in decentralized labor markets. Posner recently of-
fered a dynamic version of this view:
The inflationary process is mit, therelore, seen as a question of money wa^es pursuing
profits, or pursuing (with a lag) the course of prices, or pursuing an expected rate of
increase in real incomes. It is a leapfrogging process in which each union negotiating
officer strives lo do at least as well and preferably just a wee bit better than the other
members of his club [Posner, 1978, p. U).
The hypothesis is formalized in a model of overlapping long-term
contracts by Taylor [1978].
A number of other studies have concluded that, on the contrary,
wage bargains are designed to preserve the trend growth of real wages
(see Solow [1979]). Implicit-contract theory predicts that a stable real
wage for the duration of a contract may be the market equilibrium
ofthe supply and demand for labor under uncertainty. From another
point of view, Hicks predicts that stable real-wage growth will result
from labor-supply behavior and the activity of trade unions. He de-
scribes why workers will resist real wage declines:
The wage-earner's test for fair wages is not simply a matter of comparison with other
peoples' earnings; it is also a matter of comparison with his own experience, his own
experience in the past. It is this which makes him reai.st a reduction in hia money wage,
but it also makes him resist a reduction in the purchasing power of his wages, and even
;i reduction in the gn)wth of that purchasing power to which he has become accustomed
(Hicks, 1975. p. 5].
With sufficient market power, Hicks continues, the worker's trade
union will be successful in protecting real wage growth in the short
run. Solow [1979] also describes a formal model of trade-union wage
behavior for which real-wage stickiness is a Hkely outcome.
Descriptive studies of labor-market institutions as well as
econometric analysis suggest that the real-wage model is for many
countries more relevant for short-run microeconomic models (though
the United States is a case where significant wage inertia is apparent).
Formal indexation of wages to changes in the consumer price index
is common throughout the world.^ The scala mobile of Italy guar-
2. For a survey of indexation arrangements in industrial countries, see Braun
11976].
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Source. Real hourly earnings are calculated as average hourly compensation in manufacturing defluted hy
the conaumer price index. The *age data are from the 11. S. Department iifliabor. Bureau of LBliiirSt«listic.ii,Ofr[L*
of Productivity and Technology, Oulpul. per Hiiur. Hourly Compensatiiin. and Unit Labor Citsts in Manufacturing,
Elenen Countries. 1950-1977 {May i, 197SI; the price data are from the/ntefflationoJFinancio/SfaiisticB nfthe
IMF.
antees close to 100 percent indexation of wages for a large segment
of the work force {see Lubitz [1977] and Faustini [1976]). Incomes
policies in Britain have actively encouraged the use of contracts that
link wages to the consumer price index (see Miller [1976J, p. 513).
Similarly, it has been shown that the Australian Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission sets the National ]Vlinimum Award Wage
to protect (or indeed to accelerate) real-wage growth (see Pitchford
[1977]). Further examples abound.
These mechanisms for preserving real-wage growth have been
tested in recent years. Table I illustrates the constancy of real wage
growth in the face of the worldwide "great recession" of the mid-
197O's. In Bruno and Sachs [1979b] it is argued that the 1973 oil-price
hike and the boom in primary commodities required a substantial
deceleration of real-wage change for output growth to be maintained.
Except in the United States and Japan, no deceleration in real-wage
change is evident until two years into the recession; in 1976 real wages
declined relative to trend. The very high inflation rates in 1973 and
1974 did little to moderate real wages.
Elsewhere [Bruno and Sachs, 1979b] I describe a test to dis-
criminate between wage-wage and wage-price behavior in seven
OECD economies. Regressions are presented describing nominal-wage
change as a linear function of past wage changes, expected price
changes, and lagged unemployment. In France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, and the United Kingdom, the coefficient on lagged wages is
not significantly different from zero when expected inflation is in-
cluded in the regression; only in Canada and the United States did
lagged wage change affect current wage change. Only in the latter two
countries is there evidence that changes in expected inflation alter
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the real wage, as is required in the M-F model.'' As is suggested by
Tahle I, real wages exhibited a statistically significant lagged response
to unemployment in all countries except the United States and
Canada.
II. T H E SHORT-RUN MODEL
In this section it is shown that real-wage rigidity alters the
ranking of monetary fiscal policy in the short-run M-F model, as first
described in Casas [1975]. The comparative statics results of the
real-wage model are extended to include two dynamic elements: lags
in wage indexation: and declines in real wages in response to sustained
unemployment.
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Superscript e indicates expectation; asterisk indicates foreign;
lower-case letters denote logarithms of upper-case variables. For all
X, X, denotes the partial derivative of X with respect to its ith
arguments. The time rate of change of X, dX/dt, is denoted by X, the
steady-state value of X by X.
We turn first to the aggregate supply side. Technology is char-
acterized by the neoclassical production function F{K,L) with fixed
'.\. Using the notation listed below, the estimated equation is w, = oo + «i (log
manhours) + a2«'(-i + (1 - «y)/ir, +tV3(tinie) + (,. IftV2= 1, we have a pure wage-wage
process. If tv^  = 0. we have a wage-price process. The regression can be rearranged to
yield li',. = (»o + ai (log manhiiurs) - a-z^p't^ - Wt-\) + (/>r^  - pc,) + «a (time) + u- If
((2 > 0, an acceleration of expected inflation above last period's nominal-wage change
will reduce the real wage. For details see Bruno and Sachs [1979bl.
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capital stock. Firms operate under conditions of perfect competition,
and employ labor according to W/P = F2- Simple duality theory
permits us to write output as Q = Q{WlP,K) anAQi <0andQ2>0-
Log-linearizing, and ignoring the constant capital stock, we have"*
(1) q = —a{w - p) output supply.
With domestic consumption of home and foreign goods, a true
price index may be approximated by Pc = P^{P*Ey^~''\ where X is
the share of domestic goods in domestic consumption (the index is
exact for a Cobb-Douglas utility function). Thus, Pc = \p +
(1 — X)(p* + e). Equation (1) may be rewritten as
(1') q = -awc + ^TT,
where TT = p — p* — e,Wc = w — pc, and /^  = (1 — \)cx. For any given
real wage, an increase in the terms of trade TT reduces the product wage
{w — p), thus raising aggregate supply.
We adopt a simple form for the two wage hypotheses:
(2) w = Wl) + Opf. wage equation.
For 6 = 0, nominal wages are fixed at wo. For 6 = 1, real wages are fixed
at WQ.
A semi-reduced-form segregate demand schedule is specified:^
(3) q = 7]D* + y-2g + 7.-)7' aggregate demand
and
(4) T = -6iq + OzQ* - O'^TT trade balance.
In (3) aggregate demand is a positive function of net claims on for-
eigners, D*, through a wealth effect,** a positive function of the fiscal
4. For a CES production technology, a = arr/d — a), where a is the elasticity of
substitution and a is the output elasticity with respect to labor.
5. Consider the following brief derivati<m (see Dombusch |1976al, for a similar
model). With 3 Metzler savings function, savings is proportional to the gap between
desired wealth H'^ and actual wealth H. We define net household wealth as the net bond
claims of domestic residents on the rest of the world, in domestic currency units ED*IP
(high-powered money is not included in wealth, for reasons described in note 6). [n
turn, H'' is a fixed multiple of disposable labor income. For lahor share in output a,
we have S = uiW - H), H'' = A(aQ - G) (with a balanced budget and ignoring do-
mestic bonds, taxes equal government spending G). From the national-income ac-
counting identity, C + S + Tax = V, where Y is national income. In turn, V = Q +
R*{ED*/P): Y is equal to domestic output plus net income flows from abroad. Finally.
Q = C+G + T. Putting all the pieces together, we find that Q = [lu + R*){ED*IP)
+ u\G + T\lu\a. To get (3), we (log) linearize around the initial equilibrium D* = 0:
E/P = 1. Note that when T = -R*(ED*/P) (i.e., the current account is balanced), Q
is an increasing function of D*. This will be important in Section III.
6. High-powered money is a very small traction of household wealth, and can thus
be ignored. By leaving M/P out of H. we simplify tbe analysis by ensuring superneu-
trality in the real-wage model. The real side of the model may he solved independently
of the nominal exchange rate. For a discussion of this assumption see Blanchard
[1979].
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variable G, and an increasing function of the net trade balance T. In
(4) we take the simplified view that export and import demand are
functions only of output and the terms of trade. Assuming that
Marshall-Lerner conditions are satisfied, we have that 0:^ > 0.
The model is closed by specifying the asset-market structure and
the accumulation of domestic wealth,
(5) m — p = tpq — bR + hD* money demand.
Money demand is an increasing function of domestic output and bond
wealth and a decreasing function of the domestic short-term interest
rate.'' Given perfect capital mobility, the rate of expected depreciation
must equal the interest-rate differential,
(6) {eV = R ~ R* covered interest arbitrage.
Finally, domestic holdings of foreign debt change according to
the current-account balance, which is the sum of the trade balance
and the debt-service account,
(7) {e/P)D* = T + R*(eD*/P) current-account balance.
The model is solved in three steps. First, the simplest M-F model
is analyzed: a short-run perspective is adopted, and changes in D*
according to (7) are ignored. Next, two dynamic elements are added
to the real-wage version of the model: lags in wage indexation and
longer run responses of real wages to unemployment. Finally, in the
next section equation (7) is reintroduced and a more accurate, long-
run model is examined.
Solving equations (r)-(5) and imposing the rational expectation
that (ey = e = 0, we find that
(8) dq =
where A = 7303(1 + (1 - 6)a(t>] + Oa{l - X){1 -I- 6/173) > 0. Fiscal policy
is effective for a fixed real wage (0 = I), and ineffective when the
nominal wage is rigid (0 = 0). The reverse is true for monetary policy.
The home economy is insulated from changes in foreign output q*
only when the nominal wage is rigid; otherwise the shock is trans-
mitted positively. Finally, attempts to raise the real wage by increasing
tt'o reduce income.
Consider these results in terms of aggregate supply (1'). Monetary
policy w{)rks in the M-F model by reducing real wages; fiscal policy
7. Money demand is written as a function of ED*/P and then linearized about
I he point D* = 0. As is welt-known, if the initial claims on foreigners are positive, or
if the money stock is deflated by P.. rather than P. the strong M-F result about the
inefficacy of fiscal policy disappears. I have chosen the specification in (5) in order to
better contrast the cases of nominal and real wages.
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is ineffective because, although it improves the terms of trade, the
fiscal expansion raises real wages. Analytically,
(9) dwc = a^dg + 02(^9* - a^dm,
where oj = (1 - S)72(l + «0)(1 " ^)A"^ > 0; as = d - 0)^-^0
(1 + a^)(l - X)A-i > 0; an = (1 - ^) W 3 + «(1 " X)(l + O^i)]^''
> 0. When the real wage is fixed, fiscal policy raises the terms of trade
while monetary policy has no effect on Wc or TT.^
The effects of m, g, and g * on wages are understood by turning
to the asset markets. In the short run an increase in m causes a de-
preciation ofthe exchange rate, a rise in import prices, and a rise in
Pc. If nominal wages are sticky, the real wage declines. Contrariwise,
a fiscal expansion induces an appreciation and reduces pt.^ With
0 = 0, We rises.
The assumption of a fixed short-run real-wage can he made more
realistic in two important ways. First, even when labor-market in-
stitutions are geared to preserve a given short-run real wage,«'( might
vary because of lags in indexation of wages to price movements (see
Modigliani [1978] for such a view). Second, the real wage will even-
tually respond to unemployment. We now turn to these modifica-
tions.
8. The equation for dir ia
+ (1 - fl)(V0lA-') - dm(l - e)[a(l +
9. An increase in the money supply exerts downward pressure on interest rates
At a given world interest rate, an incipient capital outflow is induced, leading to cur-
rency depreciation. The fiscal expansion puts upward pressure on interest rates, and
causes currency appreciation. The equations for dpc and de are
+ 63dm -
where
61 = 72(1 + a<t>W - A)A-' > 0;
b2 = 73^2(1 + tt0)(l - AjA-' > 0;
64 = ((>73^3« - (I - X)(l + fli73)"lA-i % 0;
de = —v\dg - c^dq* + Cidm +
where
Cl = 72tl + (1 - O\)a<l)]A-^ > 0;
C2 = 73^2(1 + (I - «X)a,/.]A-i > 0;
-^ > 0;
0.
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FIGURE I
Wage and Exchange Rate Dynamics
Indexed contracts typically provide for a lag of at least one-
quarter in wage adjustment following a CPI increase. As an example,
in Stage 3 of the British 1972-1974 incomes policy, wage indexation
was subject to the condition that nominal wages were not to he ad-
justed until a threshold price increase had been passed. The effect of
the oil price increase in 1973-1974 was to reduce British real wages
for two quarters, after which they more than recovered. With informal
wage indexation a union may have to wait until the next round of
collective bargaining to restore real wages.
These lags suggest a simple dynamic rendering of the real-wage
model. Instead of (2) we write
(2') = W() +
w = — w),
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where u;' is the target nominal wage. Actual wages adjust to close the
gap between w and «?'.
A number of interesting conclusions emerge from the solution
of (r) , (20, and (3)-(6). Because of the lags in wage adjustment,
monetary policy will work in the short run, even though the equilib-
rium real wage is fixed. On impact, the money expansion increases
q; later, domestic price increases cause q to return to the initial level.
Fiscal multipliers, on the other hand, are smaller in the short run than
in the steady state. Indeed: the impact multipliers of a fiscal expansion
may be negative. Finally, exchange rates may overshtwt or undershoot
long-run values after a policy change, for reasons described in Dorn-
busch [1976bl.
Once again, the multiplier results are best understood in terms
of aggregate supply. A money expansion causes a spot depreciation,
reducing Wc on impact and increasing aggregate supply at the given
terms of trade. Since aggregate supply exceeds aggregate demand, the
terms of trade worsen, competitiveness improves, and domestic de-
mand increases. Aggregate supply contracts as Wc rises toward WQ. The
fiscal expansion, on the other hand, induces an appreciation and raises
We- As w falls in response to the reduced pc, aggregate supply expands
to the level shown in (8).
The dynamic model can be described formally by a two-variable
linear differential equation system:
i:
where
Oil ~ —4^^T l^sT:! "f" (1 — X)tv(l + "VS"!^ ] *^  '^ '>
ai2 — —Qn > 0>
02] = 6""'A"^[rt(l + 73^.'! — 073^3)] % 0;
and
Aj = CY{1 + 73^1) + ^373.
.021 022! I e -
Because the determinant 012^ 22 ~ 021012 < 0, the characteristic
roots are real and of opposite sign, indicating saddlepoint stability.
The phase pltuie representation is sbown in Figure I, for the two cases
1 -I- 7;,^i - 073/93 > 0 and 1 + 73^1 - 073^3 < 0. The dashed line in-
dicates the single stable arm; the exchange rate always jumps to keep
the economy along the stable trajectory.
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FIGURE II
Monetary and Fiscal Expansion
Consider a monetary and fiscal expansion in the case 1 + 73^1
- 073^3 > 0. After a money supply increase (Figure Ila), the exchange
rate depreciates to ef=o- The price level rises, and Wc falls. Subse-
quently, wages and prices rise to the new equilibrium, in equipro-
portion to the money supply increase. The fiscal expansion (Figure
lib) induces a spot appreciation and reduces prices. Since u;,. rises,
the impact multiplier is less than the multiplier calculated earlier.
In the case of 1 -t- 73^1 - 073 /^3 < 0, the impact fiscal multiplier
is negative (Figure III). The spot appreciation of the exchange rate
is less than the long-run appreciation. Since e < 0 at £0, we must have
R < R*. Given money-market equilibrium, this is possible only if at
to, q falls below its initial level.
Finally, it is easy to show that a monetary expansion will cause
the exchange rat« to overshoot if and only if I + 73^1 - 073(^ 3 > 0 (the
graphical proof is immediate).









Our analysis of the simple M-F model is completed by treating
the case of short-run real-wage rigidity with longer-run real-wage
flexibility. In Bruno and Sachs [1979a] an economy is described in
which real wages respond slowly to the gap between the labor input
and long-run desired labor supply. After an expansionary shock in
g orq*, output rises according to (8). Labor input also rises, by the
amount dq/a, where a is the output elasticity of labor. If desired labor
supply is not infinitely elastic, there will be excess demand ior la-
bor at the initial Wc, and real wages will begin to rise. We saw earlier
that increases in WQ reduce output, so the induced rise in real wages
reduces the multipliers of g and q* on q. Some of the expansionary
effect is dissipated by an increase in w^ and 7r, and a fall in world
competitiveness.^**
III. T H E LONG-RUN MODEL
As is well-known, the short-run M-F model is seriously flawed
by its failure to treat the long-term wealth effects of current-account
10. Suppose that the long-run wage elaaticity of labor supply is p, and that the
real wages adjust slowly to close the gap between labor mput and desired supply: u>,
= u ( / - / s ) = tx{l - pwr). Since I = q/a {up to a constant term), equilibrium real wages
are given by Wc = q/pa. If we add this condition to the model solved earlier (in tjie case
of e = 1), the output equation is d</ = d^'l«72(l - X)A2'] +d(/*l7a"2"(l - AjAj ],
where Aa = y-idsd + txjpa) + (1 - X)(l + O^z) > A > 0. The multipliers on i! and q*
have been reduced.
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imhalance.i' Here we add the wealth effects to the model of Section
I, to see whether the distinction between nominal-wage and real-wage
rigidity remains important in the long run. The answer is that it does,
though in an unexpected way.
As shown in Rodriguez [1979] and Sachs [1979], the conclusions
of the M-F model must be altered if the wealth Hows due to current-
account imbalances are taken into account. With a fixed nomimal
wage the long-run multipliers of monetary and fiscal policy are both
likely to be positive, unlike the zero multiplier on g in the model of
Sectitin 1. With real-wage rigidity, the money multiplier is again zero,
given the nominal-real dichotomy ofthe long-run model. The long-run
fiscal multiplier, however, is negative.
Under both wage assumptions, the fiscal expansion raises output
and leads to a current-account deficit on impact. D* falls according
to (9). The decline in wealth causes aggregate demand to fall. If real
wages are rigid, the initial output level is reached and the trade ac-
count is again in balance. But the decline in D* has now moved the
debt-service account into deficit, and the overall current account
remains in deficit. Output must decline still further in order to reduce
imports, thqs balancing the debt-service account deficit with a
trade-account surplus. With fixed nominal wages, the decline in D*
is eventually accompanied by a depreciation of the currency. Real
wages fall, aggregate supply expands, and the economy's international
competitiveness improves. The current account is balanced at a higher
level of output hecause ofthe improvement in competitiveness.
The long-run multipliers are found by solving equations (1'),
i2)-(6), and requiring that D* = 0 in (7). Equation (7) is linearized
around E/p = 1, A* = T = 0, so that D=T+ R*D*:
(10) dq = lA3~'(7i - 73/e*)(l - e)daa]dm
+ [5l93(l - fi)oc - R*aa - \)0]y2Ar^dg
+ IA;r^^2(Ti - ysR*)»m - \)]dq*,
where
A;, = {1 - 0^10193(71 - 73/2*)tv + dM]
+ (7! - yaR*)[O;i + H.aen - X)] - aO{l - \)R\
7i - 73/?* is assumed to be positive.12 When £/ = 0, A3 is necessarily
11. Recent papers that discuss long-run wealth effects of the current account
include Dnrnhusch and Fischer |197H], Rodriguez [1979|. and Sachs |1979l. None of
these papers compares^  adjustment under alternative wage assumptions.
12 Since (/= 7iO* + 7-2^-1-73r. and T =-/?»D*. (7, - 7:,fl') >() is the con-
dition thai an increase in Inne-run D* raise aggregate demand. The condition emerges
naturally from a structural derivation of equation (3). See note 5.
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positive. For 0 = 1, stability requires A^ to be positive, and this is as-
sumed.i-' Thus, for 8 = 0, dq/dm > 0, and dq/dg > 0. For f' = 1, dq/dm
= 0, and dq/dg < 0.
These results are sensitive to the specification ofthe trade bal-
ance. We have assumed that net exports depend only on output and
not on the distribution of income between the private and public
sector.^'' If a balanced-budget fiscal expansion shifts demand from
foreign to home goods, the fiscal policy can increase q in the long run
even with rigid real wages. Thus, we must distinguish analytically
between the expenditure-increasing and the expenditure-switching
effects of government spending. When fiscal policy is effective in the
long run, the short-run multiplier will tend to be greater than the
long-run multiplier.
The impact effect of fiscal poliey is positive in both the nomi-
nai-wage and real-wage models. The dynamic equations for the
nominal-wage model are
I e I _ [fell 6i2][ (^ ~ ^D*\ [621 fc22][/?* -^
where
bj., = i)^^Aj'[A46 + 7i(tv0 + 1)] > 0;
- 0:iA4) > 0;
f ds)] e 0,
where A4 = tv + cyy^O^ + y^^fh > 0.
In Figure IV a phase plane representation of a fiscal expansion
is shown for the case 6..2 < 0. Sinee 6ii/?22 - ''21^12 < 0. we again have
saddlepoint stability. With a fiscal expansion the D = 0 locus shifts
up, and the e = 0 locus shifts down. The exchange rate depreciates
along the adjustment path, so /?,=« > RUo- By the money market
equation, yt=Q must be greater than the pre-expansion level.^ '^  Note
that the exchange-rate depreciation coincides with a current-account
13. Using (1') and {2)-(7) under the condition « = 1, we find that dt)*/dD* =
-A3[a(l - X) + «(1 - XlTa i^ + ^37:1)"'. Since this expression must be negative Tor
stability. A3 must be positive. . .
14. Equation (7) suggests that the private and public sector marginal propensities
to import are equal, or that imports are in large part intermediate and capital goods,
tied less to income than to output.
15. Substituting (1) into (5), m-iv = (<}> + l/a)q ~ bRW*. A rise in R at constant
D* requires a rise in y for money-market balance.
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deficit, as found in other models (e.g., Dornbusch and Fischer [1978]).
In the case, b-i-z > 0 (not shown), the same conclusions hold.
In the real-wage case, the impact effect of fiscal policy is given
by (8), if we ignore lags in short-run indexation. The comparative
statics result of the short-run model coincides with the impact effect
in the long-run model. As D* falls, q falls below this initial level. By
solving the full dynamic system, it may be shown that the exchange
rate again depreciates with a current-account deficit and appreciates
with a surplus.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In discussing the merits of alternative macroeconomic policies
tor open economies, too little attention has been paid to labor-market
analysis. I have argued that the wage-wage and wage-price models lead
to fundamentally different conclusions regarding the efficacy of fiscal
and monetary policy. At issue is whether real exchange rates and real
wages can be changed by movements in nominal exchange rates. If
so, the Mundeil-FIeming conclusions are upheld; if not, the opposite
conclusions obtain.
The distinction between real-wage and nominal-wage adjustment
patterns is not merely a feature of small-country models. In the
standard short-run, two-country model, a fiscal expansion in one
country raises income in both. Not so with fixed real wages in both
countries. The fiscal expansion is beggar-my-neighbor, raising income
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at home and decreasing income abroad (see Bruno and Sachs
[1979bl).
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence of Section I suggests that
the task of policy is complicated by the presence of different wage-
adjustment patterns in different countries. The two views of wage-
determination must be subjected to more rigorous empirical analysis,
so that informed policy choices may be made.
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